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"For those who like to speak of an 'Age of Constantine' that began in the fourth
century," Martin Marty observes, "there is reason to regard [Jefferson's Virginia Bill
for Religious Freedom] as the key moment of the end of that age and the beginning
of a new one."' And even more than Jefferson, James Madison was the principal
prophet of that new age. Madison authored perhaps the most powerful brief for
religious disestablishment that has ever been written, he pushed Jefferson's bill
through the Virginia legislature, and his common sponsorship of that measure and
of the First Amendment provided the pretext on which the modem Supreme Court
read the Virginia provision into the Constitution.2 If the era before the 1780s was the
"Age of Constantine," then the period since then can with even greaterjustification
be called the "Age of Madison."
And what is the condition of religious freedom in the Age of Madison? Here we
encounter a paradox. On the one hand, we often suppose that no society in history
has afforded greater scope of protection for a diverse range of religious belief and
conduct 3 On the other hand, there is something approaching unanimity on the
proposition that the prevailing discourse of religious freedom--or the official
framework and language within which issues of religious freedom are argued and
judicially resolved-is deeply incoherent.4 Our situation is just the reverse, it might
seem, of that of earlier periods in which apologists and theorists could argue about
* Robert and Marion Short Professor, Notre Dame Law School. Challenges at and after
the conference, as well as later comments by Andy Koppleman and Michael Zuckert, made
it clear that further elaboration of the argument would be in order at various places, but time
and the "short essay" format have precluded much additional elaboration here. After the
conference I did prepare a fairly lengthy section applying the criticisms of equality rhetoric
to Michael Perry's conference paper. That addition produced some rewarding exchanges (for
me, at least), but the addition also threatened to expand, risking a "tail wagging the dog"
problem. So, for present purposes, I've shrunk the addition to a single footnote. I very much
appreciate the comments and objections; though they haven't dissuaded me from the present
thesis, they do point to the need for continuing reflection-beyond the conventional formulas
and slogans-in this difficult area.
1. Martin E. Marty, The Virginia Statute Two Hundred Years Later, in T1 VmRGDNA
STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EvoLurIoN AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 1, 2 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
2. For a laudatory review of Madison's contributions to the establishment of religious
freedom in this country, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LusTRE OF OUR CouNTrY: TBE
AMmCAN EXPEmRNCE OF RELGious FREEDOM 59-91 (1998).
3. Questions might be raised about this self-congratulatory supposition. See, e.g.,
KmNETHR. CaAYcRAFr, JR., THEAMERICAN MYT oFRELIGIOUs zEEOM (1999); Stanley
Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the JustBounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L.
Ray. 2255 (1997). But those questions are not the focus of this Essay.
4. William Marshall's contribution to this Symposium provides support for both aspects
of this description. William P. Marshall, What is theMatter with Equality?, 75 IND. L.J. 193
(2000).
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questions of church and state in forceful, cogent, substantive terms5 even while actual
respect for and protection of religious freedom was comparatively feeble. As our
practice has improved, it seems, our understanding and discursive facility have
deteriorated.
How to explain this curious development? And for which part of our current
paradoxical situation does Madison deserve the credit, or the blame? In this Essay
I want to argue that Madison-as symbol and to an impressive extent as actor-is
the source of both the happy and unhappy parts of our current situation. Moreover,
this is not a case in which Madison's positive contributions were partially marred by
unfortunate extraneous mistakes, or in which our inheritance includes both a
valuable estate and some regrettable independent debts. On the contrary, the two
aspects of our situation are interrelated; we likely could not have one without the
other. So in both our virtues and our vices we are Madison's faithful heirs.
I. THE FIRST BEQUEST: THE PRiNCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY
Probably the most visible part of Madison's legacy is the principle-by now
regarded as a sort of central and self-evident truth-that all religions should be
treated as equal before the law. For two and one-half centuries before Madison, from
the time in which the Protestant Reformation had fractured Western Christendom,
European states and their colonies had struggled to find a satisfactory principle for
regulating the conflicts among competing faiths. The earliest principle had favored
monolithic religious establishment. Thus, the Peace of Augsburg had decreed that
the religion of the prince should be the religion of the realm--cujus regio ejus
religio.6 That principle had been challenged-but only in part-by proponents of a
different approach, which we might call the principle of toleration.7 But toleration
was still offensive to some because it implied that some religions were favored over
others.' To borrow a modern expression, toleration meant that even if people were
allowed to practice their religions, still some religions were "insiders" while others
were "outsiders."
So a few visionaries like Madison favored a more radical principle-a principle
of religious equality-that aimed to eliminate the remaining invidious distinctions.
The discourse of religious freedom as it has evolved in this country has come to
regard the equality principle as axiomatic, and credit for perceiving and promoting
that principle is often given to Madison. The honor is deserved. Madison was ahead
of his time in emphasizing-again and again-that all religions should be treated
equally. Thus, in 1776, when Virginia was adopting a bill of rights for itself as a
state, George Mason offered a provision ensuring the "[tloleration" of diverse
5. For a discussion of the more substantive character of discussions of religious freedom
during the early colonial period, see Steven D. Smith, Separation and the Fanatic, 85 VA. L.
REv. 213, 239-46 (1999) (book review). For an earlier period, see the various positions
excerpted in BRIAN TIRNEY, THE CRIsis OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-1300 (1964).
6. See OWEN CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION 143 (1964).
7. See, for example, JOHNLOCKE, ALETERCONCERNINGTOLERATION (Mario Montuori
ed., Martin Nijhoff 1963) (1689), for perhaps the best-known expression of this position.




religions.9 Mason may have thought he was expressing the enlightened or
progressive sentiment of his time, but Madison wanted-and got-more: the
provision was amended to say that the free exercise of religion extended to all
equally."0 William Lee Miller. comments that "everything that was to come in the
American arrangement of these matters [of religion and government] was already
present in Williamsburg, Virginia, in June of 1776, in the proposals of young James
Madison.""
Later, in his famous Memorial andRemonstrance, Madison argued eloquently on
behalf of religious equality. 2 And in the First Congress, Madison proposed a
constitutional amendment providing that "[n]o state shall violate the equal rights of
conscience."' 3 Nitpickers may point out that this "equality" proposal was defeated
in the Senate, and so was never presented to the states for possible ratification. But
Madison was posthumously vindicated when, using the notion of "incorporation,"
the modem Supreme Court construed the Constitution as ifit contained the provision
that Madison had favored. 4 Consequently, the equality principle (along with the
corollary notion that government must be "neutral" in matters of religion) has
provided the major premise under which modem religion clause controversies have
been debated and decided.
So if there is cause to question Madison's legacy in this respect, it is not because
of any uncertainty about his zeal in championing the equality principle. Questions,
if there are any, would have to concern the value of that principle.
A. Equality and Evasion
And in fact there is room to wonder whether the equality principle has been
entirely beneficent in its influence. Suppose, for example, that we were to reflect on
Madison's favored principle immediately after reading Peter Westen's well-known
essay, The Empty Idea ofEquality 5 The thrust of that subversive essay, you may
recall, is that equality is a purely formal notion; it is entirely parasitic on
9. WLLIAM LEE MILER, THE FmrST LIBERTY 3-7 (1986).
10. See id. at 5-7.
11. Id. at 7; see NOONAN, supra note 2, at 69-71.
12. JAMESMADISON, MEMORIALANDREMONSTRANCEAGAINSTRE.IGIOUSASSESSENTS
(1785), reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 18, 20 (Robert S. Alley
ed., 1988). Madison wrote:
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are to be
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions.... Above all are they
to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the free exercise of Religion
according to the dictates of conscience." Whilst we assert for ourselves a
freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to
be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have
not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us.
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
13. CREATING THE BILL OF RIG-rs: THaE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGREss 13 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
14. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
15. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982).
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independent substantive criteria for its practical meaning and consequences, and it
adds nothing to those criteria once they are identified. Equality simply means that
like cases should be treated alike-a proposition with which no one really disagrees.
What people do disagree about is whether some particular case really is like some
other case in relevant respects. But the notion of equality does nothing to help
resolve that sort of disagreement.
To put the point more generally, every person is in different ways both like and
unlike every other person. Every situation is like every other situation in some
respects but not in others. Political and legal controversies hinge on the substantive
criteria that make particular similarities and differences relevant for a particular
purpose; and the principle of equality in itself does nothing to supply those criteria.
If we agree on the substantive criteria that should govern a matter then the addition
of "equality" is not necessary, and if we don't agree on the substantive criteria then
the invocation of equality is not useful.
Westen's argument generated extensive debate, leading to an intricate and
technical literature and a few concessions by Westen himself.6 Fortunately, we need
not pursue the debate into its remote provinces; our concern here is only with the
core problem that Westen identified. It may be more helpful, for present purposes,
to approach that problem by noting that equality typically serves as a device not so
much for importing substantive criteria without full acknowledgment orjustification,
but rather for excluding particular substantive criteria from the decisionmaking
processes. Thus, racial equality typically means that race should not be taken into
account (in employment decisions, or voting privileges, or some other context).
Gender equality means that gender should not be counted as a factor for some
purpose or another. Neither sort of equality specifies what criteria should govern
hiring or voting or other sorts of matters; equality is invoked to indicate that
particular criteria should not be treated as relevant. This revised statement does not
deprive Westen's argument of significance. The exclusion of substantive criteria
from decisionnaking reflects a substantive judgment just as the inclusion or
acceptance of substantive criteria does, and neither sort ofjudgment can be defended
by invoking the concept of equality.
Claims about equality are conclusions to be argued for, in other words, not
premises to be arguedfrom. So whenever the concept or principle of equality seems
to be doing any significant intellectual work on a controversial question (as opposed
to merely expressing a conclusion), on closer inspection it will likely become
apparent that this is "illegitimate" work-illegitimate in the sense that the language
of equality is being used to import or, more often, to exclude some more substantive
values or criteria without any careful attempt to provide justification. 7 If we see
16. See PETERWESTEN, SPEAKING OFEQUALIY: ANANALYSIs OFTHERHETORICALFORCE
OF "EQuALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DIscouRsE at xx (1990) ("As a consequence of
response to the article, and further reflection on my part, I have modified my original views
in several respects.").
17. Questions at and after the conference prompt me to emphasize that the problem with
equality rhetoric is not that the notion of equality remains substantively "empty"--if it did,
then the notion would play no part in an argument-but rather that a largely formal truism
("Treat like cases alike," or "Don't treat persons or situations differently on the basis of
irrelevant distinctions") is offered as if it provided justification for substantive conclusions
[Vol. 75:61
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controversial issues being debated mainly in terms of equality, in short, we will have
reason to suspect in advance that some kind of cheating-or deception, or self-
deception-is going on.
B. Egalitarian Question-Begging in Madison's Memorial
Equipped with this suspicion inspired by Westen, let us revisit the principle of
religious equality. Can we detect any of the problems described by Westen in
Madison's use of the principle?
We might start with a small point. The Assessment Bill which Madison opposed
in his Memorial andRemonstrance had provided that each taxpayer could designate
which Christian denomination should receive his or her contribution, and it had then
limited the churches' use of this money to the purposes of paying ministers or
constructing and maintaining buildings for worship.'8 But Quakers and Mennonites
(or "Menonists," as both the bill and Madison called them) were exempted from
these restrictions-presumably on the assumption that these faiths did not believe
in or support a paid, professional ministry. The manifest purpose of this exception
was to treat these religions "equally" by allowing them to use the money in a way
consistent with their own religious beliefs and practices.' Madison quarreled with
the exemption, though; he argued that the bill violated the principle of religious
equality by granting Quakers and Mennonites a legal privilege not enjoyed by other
faiths.2"
We see here an early version of the "free exercise exemption" controversy, in
which advocates all appeal to the same principle-equality (or "neutrality")-to
argue, variously, that free exercise exemptions are constitutionally forbidden, or
permitted, or required. Should religious pacifists such as Quakers be excused from
military conscription, for example, if nonreligious objectors are drafted? That
question hinges on whether there is some relevant substantive difference between a
religious and a conscientious but nonreligious objection. Both today and in the past,
some people have thought there is a relevant difference; others have disagreed.2' But
the important point is that the formal principle of equality simply does not speak to
that substantive question at all. So the language of equality at best offers a tempting
way of begging the real question.
And that is just what Madison did in his Memorial and Remonstrance. If the
Assessment Bill treated Quakers and Mennonites differently from other Christians,
presumably it did so because its sponsors believed Quakers and Mennonites were
that need substantive justifications.
18. See A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784),
reprinted in Walz v. Tax Conm'n, 397 U.S. 664 app. at 717-18 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
19. Though still requiring Quakers and Mennonites to pay the tax, the bill provided that
they might place the money "in their general fund, to be disposed of in a manner which they
shall think best calculated to promote their particular mode of worship." Id. at 718.
20. See MADIsON, supra note 12, at 20.
21. For a lucid discussion of the question, see Michael W. McConnell, Origins and
Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1491-
1503 (1990).
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different than other Christians-and different in a way that warranted different legal
treatment. Madison evidently disagreed. Perhaps he could have supported his
contrary view with substantive arguments. But he didn't. Instead, he chose to beg the
question by invoking the idea of equality.'
The fudginess in Madison's treatment of Quakers and Mennonites points to a
larger problem that afflicted Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance at all levels.
Though he insisted that all religions should be treated equally, an inspection of the
Memorial and Remonstrance reveals that in one sense Madison's argument
pervasively depended on treating religions differently. His very argument
discriminated among faiths by accepting and endorsing some religious views while
rejecting other religious views. We might roughly describe the religious beliefs in
which Madison's argument was grounded as theistic-and not merely theistic but
Christian, and not merely Christian but Protestant, and not merely Protestant but
reflective of a sort of nonstatist, voluntaristic Protestantism akin to that of the
Baptists whom Madison had earlier defended against persecution and who later
provided the votes to elect Madison to Congress.' Throughout the Memorial and
Remonstrance Madison made arguments and drew conclusions with which not only
atheists but also Catholics and Protestants in the mainstream Lutheran and Reformed
and Anglican traditions would surely have taken issue-and on the basis of their
own, different religious beliefs and commitments.24
Both in its premises and in the conclusions to which those premises led, in short,
the sort of "equality" that Madison wanted to build into law was compatible with
some religious beliefs and incompatible with others. It would be a bit severe, but not
inaccurate, to say that under the heading of "equality," Madison was in effect
seeking to have some central tenets of a particular and controversial version of
Christianity adopted as the official position of the government.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me emphasize that although Madison's use of the
equality principle was in some respects question-begging and perhaps a bit
deceptive, it was not hypocritical or inconsistent in its practical consequences. All
citizens wouldbe treated equally under the substantive views and criteria favored by
Madison, just as they would be treated equally-albeit equally. in a very different
22. To reiterate a point made earlier, see supra note 17, but one that discussion shows to
be elusive: the objection here is not that Madison's version of equality was "empty." It
wasn't-not in the end, at least. Madison, like others who use the rhetoric of equality, filled
the formal notion of equality with substantive content; more specifically, he used it in this
instance to criticize religious exemptions. The problem is that the wrongfulness of exemptions
cannot be inferred from the formal notion of equality, as Madison suggests; the opposite, pro-
exemption position is just as compatible with "equality" as Madison's position is.
23. See NOONAN, supra note 2, at 67-68, 77-78.
24. A full explanation of the theology implicit-and sometimes explicit-intheMemorial
and Remonstrance would require a longer treatment than is possible here. But the fact of
theological content can hardly be in doubt. See, e.g., id.; McConnell, supra note 21, at 1453.
And the controversial character of that content is apparent from the fact that many other
differently minded religionists obviously disagreed with Madison's views. For a lengthier
treatment of one aspect of the theology of the Memorial and Remonstrance, see STEVEN D.
SMrrH, Is TOLERATION IMPossIBLE? AMERICAN PLURAuSM AND TBE ULTRA-PROTESTANT
TuRN (work in progress).
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way-under the substantive beliefs and criteria favored by Madison's opponents (or,
for that matter, under the substantive beliefs and criteria that had guided the
Massachusetts Puritans, or the Inquisition). Madison and the Puritans both believed
that like cases should be treated alike, and they both made judgments on the basis
of their overall understandings of the world-understandings that were in important
part "religious"-about which cases were and were not alike. In that sense, they both
worked to have their substantive views-views that were often religious in
nature-embodied in the law.
Insofar as their substantive religious views differed, of course, the results of the
equal application of these views would also differ. We might say that both the
Madisonian and the Puritanpositions rejected some religious beliefs as heretical, and
both positions also imposed legal burdens on heretics; they differed in the specific
content of their heresies and in the specific legal sanctions they would impose. Under
the Puritans' religious views, someone like Roger Williams would be deemed
heretical and legally sanctioned-perhaps, as in Williams's case, bybeing banished
from the community. Under Madison's religious views, someone like John Cotton
(or perhaps Patrick Henry, or any religiously motivated proponent of religious
establishment) would be deemed in error and legally sanctioned-by being
constitutionallyprohibited from implementing his more establishmentarian religion.
But in both positions, like cases would be treated alike.
So in many respects, James Madison and the Massachusetts Puritans were similar.
But there were two crucial differences. Most obviously, as I have just said, they
differed in their substantive religious views. But they also differed in the discursive
strategies they adopted to promote those views: the Puritans were in a sense up-front
about their efforts to embody their religious beliefs in law, while Madison's more
deliberate use of the language of equality tended to conceal the legal adoption of his
own religious beliefs and the legal rejection of incompatible religious beliefs.
Since Madison was working in a transition period in which the new regime still
had to be actively argued for, the concealment was less complete than it would later
become: Madison's religious premises and his reliance on those premises in shaping
the law were still readily visible. Indeed, the appeal to equality was not Madison's
featured argument; it appeared in the Memorial andRemonstrance only after a more
explicitly theological rationale had been presented.' We might say that Madison had
only begun to glimpse the rhetorical possibilities opening up with the new nation's
commitment to "equality." In the ensuing two centuries these possibilities would be
fully exploited.
C. Equality in the Modern Discourse ofReligious Freedom
Rhetorical exploitation of the idea of equality, or of closely related concepts like
neutrality, pervades the modem discourse of religious freedom. Consider (to take an
example almost at random 6) Christopher Eisgruber's and Lawrence Sager's
argument about the still controversial issue of free exercise exemptions. In
addressing this and other issues of religious freedom, Eisgruber and Sager start from
25. See SMrrH, supra note 24, for a more detailed presentation of that rationale.
26. It is purely a coincidence that I pick an example from a review criticizing my work.
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a principle much like Madison's, which they call the principle of "equal regard." In
general, "equal regard" means that "the interests and concerns of every member of
the political community should be treated equally"; 27 and in the context of religion
this principle implies, they say, that "the government is obliged to treat the deep
religious commitments of members of minority religious faiths with the same regard
as it treats the deep commitments of other members of the society."'
The basic notion of equal regard is one that no one could sensibly or perhaps even
coherently reject, I think, but notice how the inevitable question-begging is already
being introduced in the corollary. That corollary quietly smuggles in (without
actually declaring or defending) substantive criteria under which "deep"
commitments are relevantly like each other and unlike other commitments-shallow
commitments, perhaps?-but in which "religious" commitments are not relevantly
different than nonreligious commitments. What matters, in other words, is the
"depth" of a commitment, not its religious character. Eisgruber and Sager have not
yet come to the question of free exercise exemptions, but once the notion of "equal
regard" has been tilted in this way, the answer is foreordained: the distinctiveness
of religion as religion has already been tacitly denied as part of the very definition
of equality. So we hardly need to read any further to know that Eisgruber and Sager
will go on to conclude that specifically religious exemptions are constitutionally
offensive: minority religious believers canbe excused from general laws only to the
extent that nonreligious citizens with "comparable commitments" are likewise
excused.29
One might have thought that whether religious and nonreligious objections are
"comparable" for exemption purposes is precisely the question at issue. But that is
a hard and controversial question. Rather than addressing the question, Eisgruber
and Sager circumvent it by resorting to the obliging rhetoric of "equality."
This example is simple and stark. Often scholars and jurists (and, in other
writings, Eisgruber and Sager themselves) offer more complicated and sophisticated
treatments. Rather than invoking "equality" or "equal regard," scholars may use
essentially equivalent notions, such as "antidiscrimination."3 And advocates usually
do not rely solely on the rhetoric of equality; they often mix appeals to equality with
more substantive argumentation (as Madison himself did in his Memorial and
Remonstrance as a whole). The challenge in all such cases is to extract the
substantive claims from their packaging in the beguiling language of equality, and
27. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74
TEx. L. REv. 577,600-01 (1996) (reviewing JEssEH. CHOPERSEcuRiNGREUGIousLmERTY:
PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIALINTERPRETAT[ON OFTHE REUGION CLAUSES (1995), and STEVEND.
SMrrH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUESTFORACONSTTUTIONALPRINCIPLE oFRELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1995)).
28. Id. at 601.
29. Id. at 603.
30. Michael Perry's contribution to this conference adopts as its central theme the idea
of"antidiscrimination." Michael I. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de
Si6cle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295 (2000).
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then to examine the substantive positions on their own merits. Sometimes the
positions will be able to stand on their own. But often a position will seem quite
feeble when denuded of the trappings of equality or nondiscrimination.3
My assessment of these efforts by leading legal scholars may seem harsh, so let me
quickly make some disclaimers. To begin with, I emphatically do not mean to
suggest that the scholars I have mentioned are uniquely guilty of equivocation or
question-begging. Their equality-based arguments reflectthe predominant character
of modem discourse about religions freedom, which routinely purports to deduce
answers to difficult substantive questions from the notion of equality, or from its
companion notion of neutrality. They are only doing what the Justices have been
doing, and what virtually everyone in this field has been doing. Indeed, one might
argue that the discourse of religions freedom is itself merely an example in miniature
of the modem discourse of "liberal democracy," which a critic might view as a
massive project in question-begging based on the empty notions of equality32 or,
sometimes, neutrality.
Neither do I think that the practitioners of this rhetorical art are being insincere
or consciously manipulative, any more than I think that Madison (as admirable a
figure, probably, as any in our constitutional tradition, with the possible exception
of Lincoln) was being insincere or manipulative. The magical rhetoric of equality,
especially when employed in support ofpositions that "reasonable" or right-thinking
31. As an example, consider the nonestablishment component of Perry's
antidiscrimination norm. Under this heading, Perry argues that government must not take any
action based on the view that any particular religious tenet is "truer or more authentically
American or otherwise better" than any competing religious or nonreligious tenet Id. at 308.
Packaged in the language of"nondiscfimination," this prohibition may seem appealing, even
compelling. Unpacked, the prohibition appears to be substantively equivalentto a familiar and
quite extreme position in the by now voluminous debate aboutwhether citizens, or legislators,
or other government officials maypermissibly rely on religious convictions in making political
decisions. More specifically, the prohibition that Perry attaches to an "antidiscrimination
principle" appears to reduce to the position in that debate that seeks to exclude religious
convictions as a basis for political decisions. To be sure, some scholars have taken that
extreme exclusionary position in the "religious convictions" debate. But the exclusionary
position has also been powerfully criticized-by, among many others, an earlier Perry. See,
e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND PoLrMcAL CHOICE (1988); Michael
J. Perry, Comment on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction:
ProtectingAnimals and the'Environment", 27 WM. &MARY L. Rav. 1067 (1986); Philip L.
Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious, in RELIGION AND
CONTEMPORARY LBERALSM 138, 156-59 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997); Nicholas
Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us About Speaking andActing in
PublicforReligious Reasons, in REUGION AND CONTEMPORARYLMERAUSM, supra, at 162,
172-76. However one comes out in this debate, it seems clear that the exclusionary position
is highly controversial and in need of serious justification; it cannot be rendered acceptable
merely by being piggybacked onto an "antidiscrimination principle."
32. Michael Zuckert has cogently argued, for example, that the whole edifice ofRawlsian
political liberalism rests on just such equivocations about the meaning of equality. Michael
P. Zuckert, IsModern Liberalism Compatible with Limited Government? The Case ofRawls,
in NATURAL LAW, LIBERASM, AND MORALrrY 49, 75-78 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
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people regard as axiomatically correct, seems able to beguile the rhetoricians at least
as effectively as it beguiles their audiences.
Finally, I do not even mean to suggest that the question-begging rhetoric of
equality is a bad thing, or that it is something necessarily to be regretted or avoided.
Whether or not such rhetoric is desirable presents a question that cannot be decided
in the abstract. And so we need to return to that question after first considering the
other major part of Madison's legacy.
II. THE SECOND BEQUEST: RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Madison's less celebrated but perhaps more important contribution to religious
freedom lay in his recognition, carefully and eloquently presented in Federalist 10
and again in Federalist 51, that the best way to maintain a condition of religious
freedom in a religiously pluralistic society is not to subject the pluralism to some
legally enforceable substantive principle, but rather to permit the pluralism to
flourish-and to maintain institutional structures (such as federalism) in which
pluralism can flourish.33 We might call this Madison's "positive pluralism" theme:
unlike so many other people who saw pluralism only as a problem-as a source of
civil strife possibly culminating in tyranny-Madison recognized that pluralism
could also be a solution to an array of potential problems. To be sure, Madison
proposed pluralism as an answer to the problem of faction in general, not just
religious faction. But he explicitly included religion in his analysis.' "In a free
government," he insisted, "the security for civil rights must be the same as that for
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the
other in the multiplicity of sects. '5
It might be argued that Madison deserves less credit for the religious pluralism
theme than he receives for the equality theme. After all, Madison obviously did
nothing to originate religious pluralism in this country; it grew up on its own,
perhaps with the aid of more providential nurturing. It may also be that, unlike the
religious equality theme, which Madison articulated repeatedly and with conviction,
this "positive pluralism" theme was something that Madison stumbled onto almost
by accident as he tried to defend the Constitution against the argument, taken from
Montesquieu, that republican governments must necessarily be small.' But
regardless of how he came to the view, Madison did recognize and articulate the
33. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51, at 78, 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
34. See TuE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 33, at 84 ("A religious sect may degenerate
into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy, but the variety of sects dispersed over the
entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source.").
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 33, at 324.
36. Robert Wiebe suggests that Federalists like Madison were not initially committed to
a strongly federalist system at all, and indeed were opposed to it in the constitutional
convention. They came to favor federalism only by necessity when their preferred
arrangements were defeated. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY:
FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITTION TO THE EVE OF DIsuNION 24-25 (1984).
"Unrepentant they simply lost the vote, and in the process they became federalists in spite of
themselves." Id. at 25.
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positive function of pluralism more clearly than anyone else seems to have done, and
he worked energetically for a Constitution that would maintain it.
So pluralism was a direct and intended consequence of the federalism that was at
least an original purpose-or, in my view, the original purpose27-of the First
Amendment religion clauses. And it seems clear that this pluralism deserves most
of the credit for the elimination of religious establishments in this country and for
the spectacular growth of a diversity of religions and faiths.' For example, within
a half-century after the adoption of the Constitution, all states had eliminated their
official religious establishments-whollywithoutprodding, we should note, fromthe
Supreme Court. During this same period a large number of religious movements and
experiments sprang up throughout the country.39 Some of these, such as revivalism,
were outgrowths ofthe more traditional faiths. Others were more exotic. Most of the
new movements, such as the Kingdom of Matthias," were short-lived; others, such
as Mormonism, proved to be more enduring.
I don't mean to suggest, of course, that pluralism was an entirely happy,
harmonious affair. Judged by conventional standards, many of the new movements
(and some old ones, such as Catholicism) were heretical, or in bad taste-or
downright immoral, or even traitorous. In the rough-and-tumble world of expanding
America, consequently, unpopular faiths were forced to endure persecution,
sometimes to migrate.4' The important point, though, is that the ferment that caused
religious diversity to flourish-and that is largely responsible for the condition of
religious freedom we enjoy today-was a product of pluralism;42 it owed little or
nothing to judicial review, or to the legal elaboration and enforcement of any
constitutional "principle of religious freedom." And if anyone deserves credit for
recognizing the function of this pluralism and for crafting a Constitution that would
preserve it, Madison does.
37. See STEVEN D. SMrn, FOREORDAmNED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-43 (1995).
38. The point is forcefully made in Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and
the Constitution ofReligious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 674 (1987).
39. For a colorful exposition of the variety of religious movements that flourished during
this period, see ALICE FELT TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL
HISTORY TO 1860, at 23-195 (1944).
40. See PAUL E. JOHNSON & SEAN WLENTz, THE KINGDOM OF MATTHAS (1994).
41. The Mormon migrations from New York to Ohio to Missouri to Illinois and finally to
the Great Basin were the most dramatic example.
42. Further reflection since the conference has led me to think that this assertion, though
correct as far as it goes, is also incomplete. Under some circumstances, religious pluralism
may be compatible with a relatively peaceful "religious freedom"; under other circumstances
it will produce intolerance and civil strife. For further consideration, see SMrH, supra note
24.
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III. PLURALISM AND THE LANGUAGE OF EQUALITY
My discussion so far has suggested that James Madison's religious legacy had two
principal parts: his promotion of a legal principle of religious equality, and his
recognition of the value of pluralism in promoting religious freedom. Though the
first of these bequests is more often celebrated in the literature of religious freedom,
I've also suggested that the second bequest has been more important in promoting
actual religious freedom. If the argument thus far is persuasive, then it might almost
seem that we could have dispensed altogether with the equality principle-which
after all has mostly been a source of deceptive and question-begging rhetoric-and
trusted our fate entirely to pluralism.
But this conclusion would overlook some crucial complications: it would overlook
the ways in which the language of equality and the conditions of pluralism have been
mutually complementary, and also the ways in which they are potentially
antagonistic. Consider first how the language of equality can complement and
support pluralism. Religious pluralism in itself is a sort of cultural fact or condition;
it is not initially a theory, or a way of talking and thinking. Still, pluralism does not
just automatically and silently work itself out. In practice, pluralism issues are
worked out in innumerable conflicts only through a process of talking and thinking.
Of course, the conflicts are more decisively worked out through processes like
politicking and litigating, but these processes depend in part on talking and thinking.
In short, pluralism generates issues that governments at all levels, as well as public
entities like school boards and private entities like business corporations, are forced
to address. Should we start the meeting (or the class, or the football game) with
prayer-and if so, what kind of prayer? Should work cease on religious holidays?
Which holidays? What books should the library stock? And so forth.
A pluralistic society has to find viable ways in which these questions can be raised
and debated. So what language should we use in discussing the issues of religious
pluralism? There is no easy or obvious answer to that question. One possibility-we
might call it the sectarian approach-is for everyone to talk in his or her own
religious (or perhaps devoutly secular) language. I might urge that questions of
public prayer be answered in terms of my understanding of scripture. You could
respond by arguing that I have misconstrued the scripture, or that what I regard as
scripture is not really scripture at all, or that the very idea of authoritative scripture
is implausible or oppressive.
There is a bracing forthrightness to this approach. There are also obvious risks.
We might never reach agreement on many issues. Debates mightbecome overheated,
or even violent. Consequently, pluralism might be jeopardized by this approach.
Given these risks, it may seem that we should find or develop a substantive
language that transcends the more specific religious belief systems that together
make up a pluralistic society. Stephen Toulmin explains how, in the aftermath of the
seventeenth century wars of religion, thinkers like Leibniz dreamed of a universal
language in which all controversies could be discussed and resolved.' - The modem
43. See STEPHEN ToULMIN, CosMopoLIs: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNrITY 100




liberal notion of a discourse of "public reason" can be viewed as a sort of pale, latter-
day descendant of this dream.
Not surprisingly, the dream has proven illusory. If such a universal language could
be developed, it would not transcend our specific religious languages; rather it would
replace them. Why talk in narrowly parochial terms if a universal discourse is
available that is both efficacious and satisfactory to people of different faiths and
traditions? The dream of a universal language in which profound substantive
questions could be satisfactorily answered is in essence the dream of a universal
religion to which everyone will be converted. Short of the millennium, when lions
will munch grass with lambs, that dream is unlikely to be realized.
So, if the sectarian approach seems too explosive but a more encompassing
language is unavailable, then what is the alternative? In matters of diplomacy, or in
everyday contexts involving colleagues or neighbors or family members, we often
confront something like this same problem; and we often deal with it by finding
ways of talking that allow us to express substantive disagreements allusively, or
indirectly, or in code, thereby softening the force of our disagreements and
criticisms. "A charming idea," one of the professors I knew as an undergraduate used
to say, and those who knew him understood the condemnation that was intended.
Even so, the effect was still a little different-and more gentle-than it would have
been if the teacher had simply said "A stupid idea" or "A truly idiotic idea."
Just how this sort of diplomatic double-talk works is a bit of a mystery to me. If we
didn't understand what the code meant, then it wouldn't work. Students who
presented papers that were pronounced "charming" would feel encouraged, and they
would work to produce more of the same. On the other hand, if we understood the
code so immediately that it ceased to be a code, or if the code vocabulary came to be
exactly synonymous with a more ordinary vocabulary, then again it wouldn't work:
calling an idea "charming" would have exactly the same belittling consequences as
calling it "really stupid." Like legal fictions,' diplomatic codes seem to work at two
levels, and to require a subtle double-mindedness on the part of both speaker and
listeners. So we manage to understand the speaker's real meaning in picking up on
his actual assessment of an idea, but then we shift back to the more conventional
meaning and away from real meaning for the limited purpose of avoiding offense.
But however it works, this sort of use of language is perfectly familiar, and it
might provide an alternative to both the "sectarian" approach and the "universal
language" approach in dealing with the issues generated by religious pluralism. To
a significant extent, it seems, the language of religious equality and religious
neutrality has served just this purpose. And its very question-begging quality, or its
propensity to let substantive values and criteria be smuggled in without explicit
acknowledgment, is what allows it to serve this function. When it works well, this
language allows issues of religious conflict to be debated and resolved, while at the
same time reassuring the parties to the conflict that they are equally valued-that no
one is an "outsider." Even as an adverse decision is reached and announced, the
losers are told that their faith is held in equal esteem with the faith of the winners.
44. See Steven D. Smith, Radically Subversive Speech and the Authority of Law, 94
MICH. L. REv. 348, 365-70 (1995).
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And the winners are reminded that their victory should not be taken as approval for
their faith.
From a detached perspective, no doubt, it will seem that a good deal of deception
is going on. At least for the moment and for the issue, the faith of the winners has
been preferred, and the faith of the losers has been rejected.45 Couching the decision
in the language of equality tries to conceal this fact. But then diplomatic double-talk
always involves a degree of concealment.
I don't quite mean to endorse this "diplomatic" deception, which to me is quite
troublesome, especially when used by academics who have no very plausible claim
to diplomatic immunity. I only mean to observe that as a historical matter the
language of equality and neutrality has provided the dominant vocabulary by which
religious pluralism has worked itself out, and also to suggest a reason why pluralism
may have found this question-begging vocabulary attractive and perhaps necessary.
With this approach, as with the "sectarian" approach, however, there are also
serious risks. One obvious risk can be noted quickly: the losers in any particular
dispute may not be taken in by assurances that their faith has not been disfavored,
and they might even feel more offended or alienated by such false assurances than
they would feel if a decision were honestly presented as reflecting at least a limited
and local rejection of their religious beliefs. In my experience, it is the winners--or
those who belong to classes not burdened by government policies and decisions
affecting religion-who seem most easily convinced that an outcome is merely a
necessary consequence of "equality" or "neutrality." But perhaps there is value even
in this. Who knows? Maybe it is better to have a governing class that operates under
the illusion that it can and should avoid making judgments about the merits or truth
of conflicting religions than a class that realizes such judgments are inevitable and
then confidently proceeds to make them. Maybe a brutal candor in this context would
eventually lead to more brutal results and policies.
The other side of this point, though, as various sorts of critical studies have pointed
out, is that this sort of reassuring illusion can blind governors to the harmful
consequences of their decisions; and this observation points to the greater risk.posed
by a discourse centered on the principle of equality. The risk is that this discourse
will fall into the hands of people who combine a sort of over earnestness with either
of two quite opposite qualities: either a kind of innocence that would lead someone
to suppose that equality or neutrality just automatically has a particular meaning,
45. Although celebrating the ideas of equality and neutrality, Edward Foley acknowledges
that both liberalism in general and particular decisions or policies of a liberal government
necessarily reject a whole variety of religious beliefs. One of the examples he discusses
involves medical care for children:
[T]he liberal state will require parents to give their children medical treatment,
even if the parents sincerely believe that their children will bum in hell forever
if they receive this medical treatment.... [W]ere it really true that giving the
child the medicine would cause her to suffer eternal damnation, then obviously
the state should not require that the child receive the medicine. But liberalism
denies that God would permit humans to invent life-saving medicines and then
punish an innocent child for being the beneficiary" of this technology.
Edward B. Foley, PoliticalLiberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CAsEW.
REs. L. REv. 963, 977 (1993).
[Vol. 75:61
MA DISON'S MIXED LEGACY
period, or conversely a kind of shrewdness that understands equality or neutrality as
rhetorical resources to be manipulated to secure the ends favored by the rhetorician.
In either case, the risk is that equality will become the banner for an aggressive
campaign-naively aggressive or shrewdly aggressive-to bring the diverse and
wayward practices of the nation's multitude of communities into line with the
requirements of "equality."' Such a campaign would turn equality from being
pluralism's ally-admittedly a somewhatunsteady ally-into pluralism's nemesis. 7
CONCLUSION
My own observation is that over at least the last half-century there have been many
such earnest people in this country. Some of them are called "Professor." Some wear
black robes. It is hard to tell, of course, whether someone falls into the "innocent"
aggressive category or the "shrewd" aggressive category, since both types will talk
in pretty much the same way. And though it ought to be impossible, a person might
in fact belong to both categories; this is one of the many ways in which human
nature scoffs at crude rationality. But in any case, Madison's legacy will continue to
have value for us, I think, only to the extent that his first bequest does not manage
to overwhelm his second.
46. In my view, the companion cases of Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and
School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), provide a dramatic illustration of this
possibility. In those cases, the Supreme Court invalidated remedial education programs that
by all accounts had benefitted hundreds ofthousands of children based on strained and largely
speculative perceptions ofpossible inconsistencies with constitutional neutralityrequirements
developed by the Court. The decisions were largely overruled inAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997).
47. These risks are not exhaustive. Perhaps an even more worrisome possibility is that the
discourse of equality might so habituate us to dealing with fundamental questions in a
question-begging, sophistical way that we become incapacitated to consider such questions
directly and honestly. That possibility is worrisome because it would potentially threaten not
only the health of democracy but also what is arguably among the most essential of human
qualities-the ability to really believe something, as opposed to the practice of endorsing or
advocating one or another idea for purely pragmatic or tactical reasons. But this concern goes
well beyond the scope of a short essay.
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